Latest News and Efforts from the Government Accountability ProjectPress Release: IG Report Documents Serious Weaknesses in Livermore Security

21 Jul 2003 23:15:00 -0000

<h1>Press Release: IG Report Documents Serious Weaknesses in Livermore Security</h1> Tom Carpenter <img src=http://www.whistleblower.org/php/uploads/guards2.JPG> INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT DOCUMENTS SERIOUS 
 WEAKNESSES IN LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LAB SECURITY 
 
 Report Vindicates Whistleblower Allegations
 
 Livermore, CA: A report issued by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) documented serious security weaknesses in 2001, vindicating the concerns filed by security official whistleblowers who were subsequently terminated from their jobs.
 
 The OIG report was released to a public-interest group under the Freedom of Information Act filed in February 2002. The report, dated December 14, 2001, was withheld by the DOE, because it was classified, and was provided with numerous deletions to the Government Accountability Project.
 
 The report documented numerous weaknesses and found that the federal Laboratory was not in compliance with its own procedures. Among the findings in the report:
 
 We found that the Livermore Protective Force's ability to comply with the Site Safeguards and Security Plan is questionable considering that Livermore has ongoing Protective Force staffing problems, has not provided required "mandatory" refresher training to Protective Force Officers, has not provided required tactical and safety equipment to Protective Force Officers, and has not conducted required Protective Force training exercises. We also found that the Livermore Protective Force has incurred an increasing attrition rate over the last, three and one half years which has resulted in a large number of new hires, and an approximately 25 percent overtime rate. This situation could impact the effectiveness of Livermore's Protective Force. We found that weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics need to be addressed. We also determined that Livermore’s policies for pursuing and arresting suspected criminals might be inconsistent with Departmental policy.
 
 
 The OIG investigation that led to the report resulted from allegations from security officers who blew the whistle after attempting to have their concerns resolved internally. Those two officers – Mathew Zipoli and Charles Quinones – were terminated from their jobs shortly after the OIG presented the report for comment to Laboratory managers. Officer Zipoli was reinstated by an order of an arbitrator. Both officers have filed whistleblower retaliation complaints in federal district court for wrongful termination 
 
 The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is a government-owned nuclear research laboratory about 45 miles east of downtown San Francisco. Eight million people reside within a 50-mile radius of the Laboratory. The Lab is owned by the U.S. Department of Energy. It stores hundreds of pounds of deadly plutonium - one speck can kill a person - and other toxic materials.
 
 The Government Accountability Project, a national non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C. and Seattle, is providing legal representation for Quinones and Zipoli. Tom Carpenter, Director of GAP's Nuclear Oversight Program, stated, 
 
 "The Inspector General report validates that Officers Zipoli and Quinones not only revealed significant security weaknesses but that they were correct in the allegations on every count. Their reward was punishment and termination. Laboratory management seems unable or unwilling to correct its security deficiencies yet predictably kills the messenger. Their actions jeopardize the health and safety of millions."
 
 More excerpts from the OIG Report:
 
 •	“We found several weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics, which has resulted in serious concerns about Livermore’s physical security.” p. 13
 •	“Our review of the Livermore Protective Force revealed that many of the complainant’s allegations were substantiated.” p. 2
 •	“We concluded that it is questionable if Livermore can actually comply with the requirements of the DOE approved Site Safeguards and Security Plan based upon the findings contained in this report.” p. 4
 •	“During the course of our inspection, we noted several significant issues that could directly impact the effectiveness of the Livermore’s Special Response Team. These issues included an increasing attrition rate, and a new hire rate of approximately 50 percent during the past three and one half years . . . This high attrition rate has resulted in increased costs to the Department because Livermore has had to conduct nine Special Response Team training academies at an estimated cost of $5,851,000 since 1998, for the hiring and training of new officers.” p. 6
 •	“[W]e found that once the initial certification training has been completed, Livermore Protective Force Officers are not completing all required annual “mandatory” refresher training or required exercises.” p. 9
 •	“At the time of our inspection activity, we found that Livermore allowed delivery trucks that are not inspected to access the Livermore site on a routine basis.” p 14
 The Laboratory continues to be plagued by security scandals, including the loss of three sets of security keys, leaving open a gate over July 4 weekend, and scandals involving top security personnel. “Whistleblowers like Zipoli and Quinones have performed a tremendous public service by raising these issues. The Energy Department should be protecting them from reprisal, and rewarding them for coming forward.” said Carpenter.
 
 ###
 
 MORE EXCERPTS FROM THE DOE OIG REPORT ON LLNL SECURITY WEAKNESSES
 
 • “Livermore’s Ability to Comply with the Site Safeguards and Security Plan is Questionable.”
 • “Livermore Special Response Team Staffing Problems.”
 • “Required Training and Exercises Not Accomplished.”
 • “Operations and Tactics Weaknesses.”
 • “Apprehension of Suspected Criminals Inconsistent with Departmental Policy.”
 (From Report, Table of Contents)
 
 • Only 55 Security Police Officers III were available for assignment in 2001 (and 43 in 2000) when 81 SPO III officers were required to guard Special Nuclear Material facilities. (paraphrased from Report, p. 7)
 
 • Since 1998, 55 SPO III officers have left the Special Response Team. It takes 12 months for LLNL to train and deploy a newly-hired SPO III officer in the Protected Area. Because of the severe attrition rate, the current SPO III force consists of 50% new hires since FY 1999. The cause of the attrition is the high overtime rates expected and the low salary. (paraphrase from Report, p. 7, 8).
 
 • “Livermore is required by 10 CFR Part 1046 and DOE policy to hold an annual training exercise with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to coordinate mutual aid capabilities. Livermore officials said that the last time that such an exercise occurred was in 1996.” (Report, p. 10).
 
 • Livermore does not train with required “aggressor weapons” designated in procedures. (paraphrased from Report, p. 12)
 
 • “We found several weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics, which has resulted in serious concerns about Livermore’s physical security.” (Report, p. 13)
 
 • “Protective Force Safety Equipment is Lacking.” (This section has been entirely deleted)(Report, p. 17).
 
 • “Apprehension of Suspected Criminals Inconsistent with Department Policy.” (Report, p. 18.
 		
 		 If you no longer wish to receive these e-mails, please send an email with the word "unsubscribe" in the subject line. To one of the addresses below. If you are recieving these emails from <a href=mailto:gap-general-list-request@whistleblower.org>gap-general-list@whistleblower.org</a> If you are recieving these emails from <a href=mailto:gap-media-request@whistleblower.org>gap-media-list@whistleblower.org</a> <h1>Press Release: IG Report Documents Serious Weaknesses in Livermore Security</h1> Tom Carpenter <img src=http://www.whistleblower.org/php/uploads/guards2.JPG> INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT DOCUMENTS SERIOUS 
 WEAKNESSES IN LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LAB SECURITY 
 
 Report Vindicates Whistleblower Allegations
 
 Livermore, CA: A report issued by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) documented serious security weaknesses in 2001, vindicating the concerns filed by security official whistleblowers who were subsequently terminated from their jobs.
 
 The OIG report was released to a public-interest group under the Freedom of Information Act filed in February 2002. The report, dated December 14, 2001, was withheld by the DOE, because it was classified, and was provided with numerous deletions to the Government Accountability Project.
 
 The report documented numerous weaknesses and found that the federal Laboratory was not in compliance with its own procedures. Among the findings in the report:
 
 We found that the Livermore Protective Force's ability to comply with the Site Safeguards and Security Plan is questionable considering that Livermore has ongoing Protective Force staffing problems, has not provided required "mandatory" refresher training to Protective Force Officers, has not provided required tactical and safety equipment to Protective Force Officers, and has not conducted required Protective Force training exercises. We also found that the Livermore Protective Force has incurred an increasing attrition rate over the last, three and one half years which has resulted in a large number of new hires, and an approximately 25 percent overtime rate. This situation could impact the effectiveness of Livermore's Protective Force. We found that weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics need to be addressed. We also determined that Livermore’s policies for pursuing and arresting suspected criminals might be inconsistent with Departmental policy.
 
 
 The OIG investigation that led to the report resulted from allegations from security officers who blew the whistle after attempting to have their concerns resolved internally. Those two officers – Mathew Zipoli and Charles Quinones – were terminated from their jobs shortly after the OIG presented the report for comment to Laboratory managers. Officer Zipoli was reinstated by an order of an arbitrator. Both officers have filed whistleblower retaliation complaints in federal district court for wrongful termination 
 
 The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is a government-owned nuclear research laboratory about 45 miles east of downtown San Francisco. Eight million people reside within a 50-mile radius of the Laboratory. The Lab is owned by the U.S. Department of Energy. It stores hundreds of pounds of deadly plutonium - one speck can kill a person - and other toxic materials.
 
 The Government Accountability Project, a national non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C. and Seattle, is providing legal representation for Quinones and Zipoli. Tom Carpenter, Director of GAP's Nuclear Oversight Program, stated, 
 
 "The Inspector General report validates that Officers Zipoli and Quinones not only revealed significant security weaknesses but that they were correct in the allegations on every count. Their reward was punishment and termination. Laboratory management seems unable or unwilling to correct its security deficiencies yet predictably kills the messenger. Their actions jeopardize the health and safety of millions."
 
 More excerpts from the OIG Report:
 
 •	“We found several weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics, which has resulted in serious concerns about Livermore’s physical security.” p. 13
 •	“Our review of the Livermore Protective Force revealed that many of the complainant’s allegations were substantiated.” p. 2
 •	“We concluded that it is questionable if Livermore can actually comply with the requirements of the DOE approved Site Safeguards and Security Plan based upon the findings contained in this report.” p. 4
 •	“During the course of our inspection, we noted several significant issues that could directly impact the effectiveness of the Livermore’s Special Response Team. These issues included an increasing attrition rate, and a new hire rate of approximately 50 percent during the past three and one half years . . . This high attrition rate has resulted in increased costs to the Department because Livermore has had to conduct nine Special Response Team training academies at an estimated cost of $5,851,000 since 1998, for the hiring and training of new officers.” p. 6
 •	“[W]e found that once the initial certification training has been completed, Livermore Protective Force Officers are not completing all required annual “mandatory” refresher training or required exercises.” p. 9
 •	“At the time of our inspection activity, we found that Livermore allowed delivery trucks that are not inspected to access the Livermore site on a routine basis.” p 14
 The Laboratory continues to be plagued by security scandals, including the loss of three sets of security keys, leaving open a gate over July 4 weekend, and scandals involving top security personnel. “Whistleblowers like Zipoli and Quinones have performed a tremendous public service by raising these issues. The Energy Department should be protecting them from reprisal, and rewarding them for coming forward.” said Carpenter.
 
 ###
 
 MORE EXCERPTS FROM THE DOE OIG REPORT ON LLNL SECURITY WEAKNESSES
 
 • “Livermore’s Ability to Comply with the Site Safeguards and Security Plan is Questionable.”
 • “Livermore Special Response Team Staffing Problems.”
 • “Required Training and Exercises Not Accomplished.”
 • “Operations and Tactics Weaknesses.”
 • “Apprehension of Suspected Criminals Inconsistent with Departmental Policy.”
 (From Report, Table of Contents)
 
 • Only 55 Security Police Officers III were available for assignment in 2001 (and 43 in 2000) when 81 SPO III officers were required to guard Special Nuclear Material facilities. (paraphrased from Report, p. 7)
 
 • Since 1998, 55 SPO III officers have left the Special Response Team. It takes 12 months for LLNL to train and deploy a newly-hired SPO III officer in the Protected Area. Because of the severe attrition rate, the current SPO III force consists of 50% new hires since FY 1999. The cause of the attrition is the high overtime rates expected and the low salary. (paraphrase from Report, p. 7, 8).
 
 • “Livermore is required by 10 CFR Part 1046 and DOE policy to hold an annual training exercise with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to coordinate mutual aid capabilities. Livermore officials said that the last time that such an exercise occurred was in 1996.” (Report, p. 10).
 
 • Livermore does not train with required “aggressor weapons” designated in procedures. (paraphrased from Report, p. 12)
 
 • “We found several weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics, which has resulted in serious concerns about Livermore’s physical security.” (Report, p. 13)
 
 • “Protective Force Safety Equipment is Lacking.” (This section has been entirely deleted)(Report, p. 17).
 
 • “Apprehension of Suspected Criminals Inconsistent with Department Policy.” (Report, p. 18.
 		
 		 If you no longer wish to receive these e-mails, please send an email with the word "unsubscribe" in the subject line. To one of the addresses below. If you are recieving these emails from <a href=mailto:gap-general-list-request@whistleblower.org>gap-general-list@whistleblower.org</a> If you are recieving these emails from <a href=mailto:gap-media-request@whistleblower.org>gap-media-list@whistleblower.org</a> <h1>Press Release: IG Report Documents Serious Weaknesses in Livermore Security</h1> Tom Carpenter <img src=http://www.whistleblower.org/php/uploads/guards2.JPG> INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT DOCUMENTS SERIOUS 
 WEAKNESSES IN LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LAB SECURITY 
 
 Report Vindicates Whistleblower Allegations
 
 Livermore, CA: A report issued by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) documented serious security weaknesses in 2001, vindicating the concerns filed by security official whistleblowers who were subsequently terminated from their jobs.
 
 The OIG report was released to a public-interest group under the Freedom of Information Act filed in February 2002. The report, dated December 14, 2001, was withheld by the DOE, because it was classified, and was provided with numerous deletions to the Government Accountability Project.
 
 The report documented numerous weaknesses and found that the federal Laboratory was not in compliance with its own procedures. Among the findings in the report:
 
 We found that the Livermore Protective Force's ability to comply with the Site Safeguards and Security Plan is questionable considering that Livermore has ongoing Protective Force staffing problems, has not provided required "mandatory" refresher training to Protective Force Officers, has not provided required tactical and safety equipment to Protective Force Officers, and has not conducted required Protective Force training exercises. We also found that the Livermore Protective Force has incurred an increasing attrition rate over the last, three and one half years which has resulted in a large number of new hires, and an approximately 25 percent overtime rate. This situation could impact the effectiveness of Livermore's Protective Force. We found that weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics need to be addressed. We also determined that Livermore’s policies for pursuing and arresting suspected criminals might be inconsistent with Departmental policy.
 
 
 The OIG investigation that led to the report resulted from allegations from security officers who blew the whistle after attempting to have their concerns resolved internally. Those two officers – Mathew Zipoli and Charles Quinones – were terminated from their jobs shortly after the OIG presented the report for comment to Laboratory managers. Officer Zipoli was reinstated by an order of an arbitrator. Both officers have filed whistleblower retaliation complaints in federal district court for wrongful termination 
 
 The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is a government-owned nuclear research laboratory about 45 miles east of downtown San Francisco. Eight million people reside within a 50-mile radius of the Laboratory. The Lab is owned by the U.S. Department of Energy. It stores hundreds of pounds of deadly plutonium - one speck can kill a person - and other toxic materials.
 
 The Government Accountability Project, a national non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C. and Seattle, is providing legal representation for Quinones and Zipoli. Tom Carpenter, Director of GAP's Nuclear Oversight Program, stated, 
 
 "The Inspector General report validates that Officers Zipoli and Quinones not only revealed significant security weaknesses but that they were correct in the allegations on every count. Their reward was punishment and termination. Laboratory management seems unable or unwilling to correct its security deficiencies yet predictably kills the messenger. Their actions jeopardize the health and safety of millions."
 
 More excerpts from the OIG Report:
 
 •	“We found several weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics, which has resulted in serious concerns about Livermore’s physical security.” p. 13
 •	“Our review of the Livermore Protective Force revealed that many of the complainant’s allegations were substantiated.” p. 2
 •	“We concluded that it is questionable if Livermore can actually comply with the requirements of the DOE approved Site Safeguards and Security Plan based upon the findings contained in this report.” p. 4
 •	“During the course of our inspection, we noted several significant issues that could directly impact the effectiveness of the Livermore’s Special Response Team. These issues included an increasing attrition rate, and a new hire rate of approximately 50 percent during the past three and one half years . . . This high attrition rate has resulted in increased costs to the Department because Livermore has had to conduct nine Special Response Team training academies at an estimated cost of $5,851,000 since 1998, for the hiring and training of new officers.” p. 6
 •	“[W]e found that once the initial certification training has been completed, Livermore Protective Force Officers are not completing all required annual “mandatory” refresher training or required exercises.” p. 9
 •	“At the time of our inspection activity, we found that Livermore allowed delivery trucks that are not inspected to access the Livermore site on a routine basis.” p 14
 The Laboratory continues to be plagued by security scandals, including the loss of three sets of security keys, leaving open a gate over July 4 weekend, and scandals involving top security personnel. “Whistleblowers like Zipoli and Quinones have performed a tremendous public service by raising these issues. The Energy Department should be protecting them from reprisal, and rewarding them for coming forward.” said Carpenter.
 
 ###
 
 MORE EXCERPTS FROM THE DOE OIG REPORT ON LLNL SECURITY WEAKNESSES
 
 • “Livermore’s Ability to Comply with the Site Safeguards and Security Plan is Questionable.”
 • “Livermore Special Response Team Staffing Problems.”
 • “Required Training and Exercises Not Accomplished.”
 • “Operations and Tactics Weaknesses.”
 • “Apprehension of Suspected Criminals Inconsistent with Departmental Policy.”
 (From Report, Table of Contents)
 
 • Only 55 Security Police Officers III were available for assignment in 2001 (and 43 in 2000) when 81 SPO III officers were required to guard Special Nuclear Material facilities. (paraphrased from Report, p. 7)
 
 • Since 1998, 55 SPO III officers have left the Special Response Team. It takes 12 months for LLNL to train and deploy a newly-hired SPO III officer in the Protected Area. Because of the severe attrition rate, the current SPO III force consists of 50% new hires since FY 1999. The cause of the attrition is the high overtime rates expected and the low salary. (paraphrase from Report, p. 7, 8).
 
 • “Livermore is required by 10 CFR Part 1046 and DOE policy to hold an annual training exercise with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to coordinate mutual aid capabilities. Livermore officials said that the last time that such an exercise occurred was in 1996.” (Report, p. 10).
 
 • Livermore does not train with required “aggressor weapons” designated in procedures. (paraphrased from Report, p. 12)
 
 • “We found several weaknesses in Protective Force operations and tactics, which has resulted in serious concerns about Livermore’s physical security.” (Report, p. 13)
 
 • “Protective Force Safety Equipment is Lacking.” (This section has been entirely deleted)(Report, p. 17).
 
 • “Apprehension of Suspected Criminals Inconsistent with Department Policy.” (Report, p. 18.
 		
 		 If you no longer wish to receive these e-mails, please send an email with the word "unsubscribe" in the subject line. To one of the addresses below. If you are recieving these emails from <a href=mailto:gap-general-list-request@whistleblower.org>gap-general-list@whistleblower.org</a> If you are recieving these emails from <a href=mailto:gap-media-request@whistleblower.org>gap-media-list@whistleblower.org</a>